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Abstract 
The legal community has long recognized that business corporations heavily favor 
Delaware as the state of incorporation. However, a recent study of merger agreements 
from 2002 by Eisenberg and Miller suggested that, despite Delaware’s prominence as the 
place of incorporation, companies “flee” from Delaware with respect to both choice of 
law and forum, and instead prefer New York. We set out to study data from 343 merger 
and acquisitions contracted on between January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011 in an attempt 
to verify this conjecture.  Our study is important for two reasons. First, the 2011 data set 
shows that the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture is not supported in view of the new tools 
applied in our work. Specifically, we find that the state of incorporation has no effect on 
the choice of law for the state of New York, thus negating the earlier finding that 
Delaware corporations flee to New York law. The choice of forum being New York or 
some other forum is the major factor in our model, explaining about 50% of the variation 
in the choice of law for the state of New York. Thus, Eisenberg and Miller may have 
identified a transient phenomenon. Second, the article contributes to the debate about 
whether raw data alone can contribute to an understanding of a phenomenon such as the 
choice of law. We argue that, without further context such as a survey of the lawyers 
drafting the merger agreements, the usefulness of purely quantitative data is limited.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Parties to mergers and acquisitions often include choice of law and choice of 
forum provisions in their agreements. Choice of law provisions determine which state’s 
law will govern in case of a contractual dispute.5 Choice of forum provisions6 determine 
which court will apply the law. Parties are reluctant to split choice of law and choice of 
forum, tending to prefer a court to apply its own state’s laws.7 Delaware dominates 
parties’ choice of law and choice of forum provisions.8 Delaware’s prominence has 
prompted several scholars to study the reasons for and effects of choice of law and choice 
of forum decisions. 
                                                 
5
 Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 245 (1993). 
6
 Such clauses choosing forum “are now routinely enforced.” Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore 
Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2078 (2009). “They can reduce 
dispute resolution costs, promote efficient contracting, and enhance functional specialization in the 
judiciary.” Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL J. CORP. L. 333, 335 (2012) (covering the history of forum 
choice and its recognition by the Supreme Court but focusing more narrowly on instances in which 
the forum choice appears in the company charter).  
7
 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical 
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1973 (2006). 
8
 Id. at 1982. 
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Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller claimed a flight from 
Delaware to New York choice of law9 in merger agreements, suggesting that “once one 
accounts for Delaware as the place of incorporation, firms tend to flee Delaware as a 
choice of law and forum.”10 Eisenberg and Miller based their flight finding on a study of 
merger agreements in 2002.11 Law and economists subsequently cited the flight to support 
the notion that companies preferred the formalism of New York and thus, by implication, 
were consciously avoiding the law of Delaware.12 To test the Eisenberg and Miller 
conjecture, we compiled a later data set from the SEC EDGAR database13 using a six-
month period in 2011.  
Our criticisms of the original Eisenberg and Miller paper fall into two basic 
categories; one is data driven and the other is based on the limits of empirical research.   
First, our six months of 2011 merger data suggest that the conjectures of 
Eisenberg and Miller based on the 2002 merger data can no longer be supported in view 
of the new tools applied in our work. They conclude that “Delaware corporations tend to 
choose Delaware law less than other corporations choose the law of their state of 
incorporation”14 and that indicates a flight away from Delaware law. We used a two-
factor contingency table to test whether the 2011 merger history supports the Eisenberg 
and Miller claims. Based on this analysis, there is no presumption that the percentage of 
acquiring companies incorporated in Delaware that choose Delaware law is less than the 
percentage of mergers in states other than Delaware choosing the same non-Delaware 
state’s law.  
Specifically, our two way tables reveal that for 2011 the actual percentage of 
Delaware corporations that choose Delaware law, 65%, is not significantly different from 
the percentage of incorporations in states other than Delaware that select the same state 
other than Delaware for their choice of law, 70%, (P-value 34%). Thus, the 2011 data 
shows that the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on the 2002 data can no longer be 
supported. Eisenberg and Miller reached a correct conclusion based on their data, but 
these results cannot be extrapolated into the future because of the transient nature of the 
data. They may have, therefore, identified a transient phenomenon.15 
Second, to gain a deeper understanding, we used multivariate logistic regression 
in the analysis of the 2011 merger data. Eisenberg and Miller also used these more 
advanced methods in their analysis of the 2002 merger data, but they commented 
                                                 
9
 Parties are free to choose what law they want to govern their merger agreement. See Ribstein, 
supra note 5, at 247-48. In deciding whether to give effect to choice of law provisions in merger 
agreements, courts distinguish between corporate matters and peripheral ones. For corporate 
matters, even if the parties have chosen another state law, courts will apply the law of the state of 
incorporation to corporate matters under the “internal affairs doctrine.” Id. at 266.  
10
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.  
11
 Id. 
12
 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1061-62 (2009). 
13
 These merger agreements are accessible to the public. See http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. 
14 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1973. 
15
 See infra Part IV. It is unlikely that our results will agree with Eisenberg and Miller because, as 
stated in the paper, choices of states in which to incorporate and choices of state’s law and forum 
for litigation is not a stable system with respect to time. 
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“statistical theory has made only modest progress in solving complex systems of 
equations involving categorical data.”16 We strongly disagree with this assertion.17 Both 
our bi-variate tables and those of Eisenberg and Miller have shown there are 
interdependencies between the variables associated with mergers: choice of law; choice of 
forum; locations of acquiring and acquired firms’ places of business; locations of 
attorneys of acquiring and acquired firms’ offices; state of incorporation; and whether the 
acquirer and acquired are public firms. These interdependencies make it more important 
to use multivariate methods to adjust the data for interdependencies in order to estimate 
the effects of each factor independent of the other factors. Without such adjustments, bi-
variate tables may indicate associations that are due to factors common to both variates 
rather than to the variates themselves. Eisenberg and Miller did not think it was possible 
to “fully model[] all or even most of the dependencies that exist in the models reported.”18 
They stated that logistic regression is not as powerful as their bi-variate analyses. 
However, we are confident that by using multivariate methods we have estimated the 
effects of each factor independent of the other. Thus, we have greater confidence in the 
regression’s ability to isolate each factor than Eisenberg and Miller did.19 They did not 
think their logistic regression analysis was as powerful as their bi-variate analysis.20 
Our main conclusion is that the choice of law and choice of forum are highly 
dependent. The choice of forum in Delaware explains almost 58% of the variation in the 
choice of law in Delaware. But, considering all the factors from Table 1,21 we found that 
if the acquirer incorporates in Delaware and chooses Delaware as the forum and the 
acquirer’s corporate office is not New York, the choice of law will be Delaware. 
In contrast to the Eisenberg and Miller study, our data set reveals that the state of 
incorporation has no effect on the choice of law being New York. But if the company is 
incorporated in Delaware, it is most likely to choose Delaware as the choice of law to 
govern the merger agreement. Thus, the state of incorporation clearly has an effect on the 
choice of law for Delaware but not New York. This conclusion is contrary to the 
                                                 
16
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1994.  
17
 DAVID HOSMER & STANLEY LEMSHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION, (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. New York (2000)). 
18
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1994.  
19
 Eisenberg and Miller concluded “the simple descriptive story suggested by the bivariate tables 
throughout this article is reasonably consistent with the regression models we report.” Id. at 1994. 
However, their use of multivariate logistic regression ignores the importance of eliminating 
variables in the analysis that are not statistically significant. See discussion of the principle of 
parsimony in Hosmer, et al, supra note 17, at 1. That may explain why Eisenberg and Miller were 
less confident in the ability of their logistic regression models to fully account for all of the factors. 
Id. at 1994. Without the removal of statistically insignificant variables, we cannot gain a full 
picture of the effects of each factor independent of the others. Because our study has eliminated 
factors that are not statistically significant, we are confident in the ability of our regression 
methods to isolate the effects of each factor independent of the other factors. Our regression 
method demonstrates: 1) what factors explain why mergers choose Delaware law; 2) the non-effect 
of the state of incorporation on the choice of law in New York, and; 3) the fact that a major factor 
explaining the choice of law in New York is the choice of forum.  
20
 Eisenberg & Miller supra note 7, at 1994.  
21
 See infra Table 1.  
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conclusion reached in the Eisenberg and Miller study that, if a company is incorporated in 
Delaware, the company has a tendency to choose New York law. 
That non-effect of incorporation on the choice of law in New York seems to 
negate the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture connecting Delaware incorporation to a choice 
of law in New York. Our study revealed a different factor that accounts for a choice of 
law being New York. The highest probability that the choice of law is New York occurs 
when the choice of forum is New York, the acquired entity is private, and the attorney 
does business in New York.22 Ultimately, our analysis of the 2011 data set of mergers 
demonstrates that Eisenberg and Miller's conclusion that companies flee Delaware can no 
longer be supported in view of the new tools applied in our work. 
Our second criticism of the Eisenberg and Miller study is broader in nature and 
not directed at the data.23 We argue that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions 
from raw numbers without additional context or consideration of the reasons for a 
phenomenon such as the choice of law in merger agreements. For several reasons 
explored in this paper, we argue that without that additional information or context, the 
numbers alone may not be able to tell us very much.  
First, building a theory that companies are fleeing Delaware law based on the 
excess of incorporations over choice of law is problematic.24 It might be entirely 
unsurprising that there is a net outflow from Delaware, but it is be strange to jump 
immediately to the conclusion that there is an aversion to Delaware law.  
Second, an outflow from Delaware is possible in the first place because there is 
such a tremendous inflow into Delaware due to the perceived benefits of the legal system. 
Conversely, there can hardly help but be an inflow to New York given the dearth of New 
York incorporations.  
Third, it is unclear how much the raw numbers on choice of law and/or forum tell 
us about the desirability of either jurisdiction’s law. It is difficult to draw any meaningful 
conclusions without knowing why or if there was a flight. To prove a flight, you need to 
demonstrate that the decision to leave a jurisdiction was knowing, volitional, and 
deliberate with respect to the content of the law of a jurisdiction. To reach meaningful 
conclusions about a choice, it would be important to interview lawyers regarding the 
thinking underlying the choice of law in a merger agreement. That data is now available 
for the same set of merger agreements we studied to assess whether the Eisenberg and 
Miller conjectures of a flight to New York held true in 2011.25  
One surprising result of using logistic regressions for choice of law in New York 
is that it reveals a Delaware state of incorporation has no effect on the choice of law for 
                                                 
22
 See infra Table 6. 
23
 Empiricists build models of reality using these large data sets and regression. See Michael 
Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making 
and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002) (positing that statistical methods are 
integral to empirical studies). 
24
 Eisenberg and Miller built the idea of flight on the fact that the number of mergers incorporated 
in Delaware (189) exceeded the choice of law for Delaware (132). Similarly, “115 contracts that 
designated a forum had Delaware corporate acquirers” and stipulated a Delaware forum. Eisenberg 
& Miller, supra note 7, at 1982.  
25
 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Context Matters-What Lawyers Say About Choice of Law Decisions in 
Merger Agreements, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 211, 218 (2015). 
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New York. Rather, the analysis revealed that the major factor, accounting for 50% of the 
variation, for the choice of law in New York is the choice of forum.26 The Choice of 
Forum Delaware explains 58% of the variation in the Choice of Law Delaware.27 Of the 
188 DE incorporations, 113, or 60 percent, had choice of forum in Delaware. There were 
55 incorporations in states and countries other than Delaware and of these 33, or 60 
percent, had choice of forum in the same state or country. The frequency of a merger 
choosing the state for their forum to be the same as the state of incorporation is the same, 
whether the state is Delaware or another state or country. This article will suggest that 
forum may be such a significant factor in the choice of law because lawyers are reluctant 
to split the forum and the substantive law choice. Lawyers prefer to have one court decide 
the case and apply that forum’s law to the dispute.28 They are concerned that, if one forum 
decides the case but applies the substantive law of another jurisdiction, the forum court 
may misapply the law of the other jurisdiction.29 
Part II will present the data for analysis. Part III will analyze the data using bi-
variate and multivariate logistic regression and state our main conclusions drawn from the 
analysis. Part IV will explore the limits of using raw data for examining a phenomenon 
such as the parties’ choice of law without further contextual evidence about the choice 
made by the drafting parties. It will suggest avenues for further research. Part V 
summarizes our conclusions. 
II. DATA FOR ANALYSIS  
 
Eisenberg and Miller reported on 412 merger acquisition contracts contained in 
SEC Form 8-K filings30 for a seven month period from January 2002 to July 2002.31 With 
the exception of seven mergers for which both Delaware and New York were listed as the 
choice of law, these data were a complete count of merger activities reported in the SEC 
EDGAR database. On an annual basis, there were about 700 mergers per year in 2002.  
In our current research, data from a total of 343 corporate mergers were gathered 
using SEC Form 8-K filings in the six month period from January 1, 2011 through June 
30, 2011.32 Prorating this figure suggests there were about 690 mergers in 2011, which 
compares favorably to the number of mergers in 2002 studied by Eisenberg and Miller.33 
The variables associated with these mergers are listed in Table 1, including the frequency 
                                                 
26
 See infra Part III(B)(iii) (parameter estimates). 
27
 See infra Part III(B)(ii) (parameter estimates). 
28
 See Kostritsky, supra note 25, at 224 n.46 (citing to lawyer interview in which lawyer indicated 
she never bifurcates forum and governing law).  
29
 Id. at 224. 
30
 “In addition to filing annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, public 
companies must report certain material corporate events on a more current basis. Form 8-K is the 
“current report” companies must file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders 
should know about.” These would include merger agreements. http://perma.cc/SQG9-2D8X.  
31
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1985.  
32
 See supra note 30.  
33
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.  
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associated with each. It should be noted that these are all nominal variables for which the 
response was “yes” or “no” based on the SEC Form 8-K filings.  
 
Table 1 – Variables Available for Analysis 
Variable Name n 
Acquirer Incorporated in DE 188 
Acquirer Incorporated in NY 2 
Acquirer Incorporated in CA 4 
Acquirer Incorporated in Other State than DE, NY, CA 147 
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in NY 29 
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in CA 67 
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in DE 1 
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in Other State than DE, 
NY, CA 246 
Acquirer Attorney Does Business in CA 61 
Acquirer Attorney Does Business in NY 91 
Acquirer Attorney Does Business in Other State than NY 
or CA 191 
Acquired Incorporated in DE 11 
Acquired Attorney Does Business in CA 58 
Acquired Attorney Does Business in NY 69 
Choice of Law NY 47 
Choice of Law DE 162 
Choice of Law CA 13 
Choice of Forum NY 51 
Choice of Forum DE 132 
Choice of Forum CA 14 
Acquirer Private 88 
Acquired Private 188 
 
Cain and Davidoff 34 studied 1,020 mergers for a five year period of time, 2004 
through 2008, but chose to ignore acquisitions of private targets.35  With this more 
restrictive criterion for including mergers, their data only represent about 200 mergers per 
year during the 2004 to 2008 period. But this was a period of robust economic activity as 
measured by GDP, which increased until leveling off in 2008 as shown in Figure 1. Thus, 
given that Cain and Davidoff studied a smaller subset of mergers over a longer period of 
time, it is difficult to compare the results of Cain and Davidoff 36 with those of Eisenberg 
and Miller37 and our current 2011 study. 
 
                                                 
34
 Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIR. L. STUD. 
92 (2012). 
35
 Id. at 94.  
36
 Id. 
37
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
It should be pointed out that the mergers studied in 2002 and 2011 were not a 
convenience or a random sample, but rather a complete count based on the SEC EDGAR 
database. Thus, one of the major objections raised by Cain and Davidoff38 to including 
mergers with acquired (target) private companies is moot because there can be no 
skewing due to the complete sampling based on the 2002 and 2011 data. Rather, the 
factor “Acquired Private,” which was included as a potential variable in analyses by 
Eisenberg and Miller39 as well as our study, was found to introduce a statistically 
significant bias in 2011 time periods for some of the responses analyzed. Finally, any 
comparison of results from 2002 with 2011 must be viewed along with the potential 
impact of both political and economic factors, which neither the Eisenberg and Miller nor 
our present study can include. For example, the 2008 recession and sluggish recovery that 
lasted for at least six years and the passage of the Affordable Care Act are two 
interventions that could have profound impact on acquisition contracts. From Figure 1, 
the sluggish recovery of the US economy following the 2008 recession is indicated by 
change in the slope of the GDP curve: 0.72 from 2002 to 2007 and 0.55 from 2009 to 
2011. 
III. DATA ANALYSES 
 
Before reviewing the analyses of the 2011 merger data, consider the summary 
data in Table 1.40 First, among the 343 mergers, only two were acquirer incorporations in 
New York and four in California. Thus, any analyses of, or conclusions related to, 
acquirer state of incorporation must be restricted to Delaware versus all other states. 
Second, only one out of 343 acquirer corporate headquarters was located in Delaware. So 
the variable “Acquirer Corporate Headquarters” was restricted to New York, California, 
and states other than Delaware. With these caveats, the analyses of the nominal merger 
                                                 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 1996.  
40
 See infra Table 1. 
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data consisted of two factor or two-way contingency table analyses and multivariate 
logistic regression models for specific responses.  
 
A. Contingency Table Analyses—State of Incorporation Versus State for Choice of Law 
 
Eisenberg and Miller claim, “Delaware corporations tend to choose Delaware law 
less than other corporations choose the law of their states of incorporation.”41 With this 
hypothesis in mind, consider the following contingency table that was formed using the 
2011 merger data. Clearly, both New York and California had too few incidences of the 
acquirer’s choice of state in which to incorporate. Thus further analysis of this table in its 
present granular form is meaningless from a statistical point of view because 20% of the 
cells have expected values less than 5. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consolidating the New York and California states of incorporation categories 
with the “Other” state of incorporation category results in the contingency table shown in 
Table 2. The following likelihood ratio test reveals that the occupancy numbers shown in 
the first row of each cell in Table 2 are not statistically independent (P-value < 0.01%). 
                                                 
41
 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1973.  
Count 
Total % 
Col % 
Row % 
 
Acquirer 
Inc. in DE 
 
Acquirer Inc. 
in NY 
 
Acquirer Inc. 
in CA 
 
Acquirer Inc. in 
Other State 
 
 
Choice of Law 
DE 
122 
35.57 
64.89 
75.31 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
40 
11.66 
26.85 
24.69 
162 
47.23% 
 
Choice of Law 
NY 
25 
7.29 
13.30 
59.52 
1 
0.29 
50.00 
2.38 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
16 
4.66 
10.74 
38.10 
42 
12.24% 
 
Choice of Law 
CA 
4 
1.17 
2.13 
33.33 
1 
0.29 
50.00 
8.33 
3 
0.87 
75.00 
25.00 
4 
1.17 
2.68 
33.33 
12 
3.50% 
 
Choice of Law 
Other State 
37 
10.79 
19.68 
29.13 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1 
0.29 
25.00 
0.79 
89 
25.95 
59.73 
70.08 
127 
37.03% 
 188 
54.81% 
2 
0.58% 
4 
1.17% 
149 
43.44% 
343 
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Tests 
N DF -Log Like RSquare (U) 
343 3 33.006002 0.1398 
 
Test ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 66.012 <.0001* 
   
 
This Chi-Square test compares the percentages shown in the second line of each 
cell of the 4-by-2 table assuming independence. The fact that the Chi-Square statistic is 
large (P < 0.01%) is another way of saying that acquirer’s state of incorporation and 
choice of law are not statistically independent.  
Table 2 
Count 
Total % 
Col % 
Row % 
 
Acquirer 
Inc. in DE 
 
Acquirer Inc. 
in Other State 
than DE 
 
 
Choice of 
Law DE 
122 
35.57 
64.89 
75.31 
40 
11.66 
25.81 
24.69 
162 
47.23% 
 
Choice of 
Law NY 
25 
7.29 
13.30 
59.52 
17 
4.96 
10.97 
40.48 
42 
12.24% 
 
Choice of 
Law CA 
4 
1.17 
2.13 
33.33 
8 
2.33 
5.16 
66.67 
12 
3.50% 
 
Choice of 
Law Other 
State 
37 
10.79 
19.68 
29.13 
90 
26.24 
58.06 
70.87 
127 
37.03% 
 188 
54.81% 
155 
45.19% 
343 
 
But consider the results for Choice of Law NY in Table 2. In the first six months 
of 2011 there were 42 mergers in which the choice of law was New York. Of these 
mergers, 25 or 59.52% were incorporated in Delaware and 17 or 40.48% were 
incorporated in states other than Delaware. Testing the alternative hypothesis “flight from 
Delaware” incorporation for choice of law New York versus the null hypothesis of “no 
flight from Delaware” incorporation for Choice of Law New York reveals there is 
Issue 1  The Data and Its Limits  
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insufficient information to reject this null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (P-value 
21.7%). This result is contrary to the claims by Eisenberg and Miller.42 
Eisenberg and Miller further claim that—based on 2002 merger data—“Delaware 
corporations tend to choose Delaware law less than other corporations choose the law of 
their state of incorporation.”43 To test this hypothesis, consider the cases from Table 1 
where the state of incorporation and the state for choice of law are the same. There were 
122 mergers incorporated in Delaware that chose Delaware law, but 66 that did not 
choose Delaware law. There was one New York incorporation out of two that chose New 
York as the choice of law, but the other choice of law was a state other than Delaware. 
There were three out of four mergers incorporated in California that chose California as 
the choice of law, but the other merger did not choose Delaware as the choice of law. 
Finally there were 89 mergers incorporated in other states that chose other states for the 
choice of law. We will assume that these choices of law were the same as the states of 
incorporation for this analysis. Then there were 40 mergers incorporated in other states 
that did not choose Delaware as the choice of law. These are summarized as a two-by-two 
contingency table in Table 3. 
The following test statistics indicate that acquirer’s choice of state of 
incorporation is not independent of the state for choice of law, which the earlier more 
granular test revealed from the 4-by-2 table (P-value < 0.01%). 
Tests 
N DF -Log Like RSquare (U) 
321 1 19.313414 0.0887 
 
Test ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 38.627 <.0001* 
Pearson 37.776 <.0001* 
 
Table 3 
Count 
Total % 
Col % 
Row % 
State of Inc. 
Other than 
DE 
State of Inc. 
DE 
 
Choice of 
Law Other 
State 
93 
28.97 
69.92 
58.49 
66 
20.56 
35.11 
41.51 
159 
49.53% 
Choice of 
Law DE 
40 
12.46 
30.08 
24.69 
122 
38.01 
64.89 
75.31 
162 
50.47% 
 133 
41.43% 
188 
58.57% 
321 
                                                 
42
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.  
43
 Id. at 1973.  
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In Table 3, 122 of the 188 mergers that incorporated in Delaware chose Delaware 
law while 93 of the 133 mergers that incorporated in states other than Delaware chose 
another state’s law than Delaware. Note that this does not mean in these 93 mergers that 
the other state of incorporation and the other state of law were the same state, except for 
these four: one from New York and three from California. But we are assuming the best 
case scenario for these 93 cases: namely that the state of incorporation and the choice of 
law are the same state other than Delaware. The Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on 
their 2002 data can be tested from the data in Table 3. Here, the null hypothesis is that the 
percentage of incorporations and choice of law in Delaware and the percentage of 
incorporations and choice of law in states other than Delaware are the same. The 
alternative, according to Eisenberg and Miller, is that there is flight from Delaware law. 
There is not enough information in 2011 merger data to accept the alternative hypothesis 
posed by Eisenberg and Miller (P-value 34%). In the first six months of 2011, the actual 
percentage of incorporations in Delaware that choose Delaware law, 65%, is not 
significantly different from the percentage of incorporations in other states than Delaware 
that select the same other state than Delaware for their choice of law, 70%, with the 
conservative assumption44 about the other states of incorporation and choice of law. Thus, 
the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on 2002 merger history is not true based on 
2011 merger history.   
 
B. Logistic Regression Analyses 
 
While two factor contingency tables and their analyses above revealed that the 
conjectures of Eisenberg and Miller based on seven months of 2002 merger data can no 
longer be supported in view of the new tools applied in our work based on six months of 
2011 merger data, what do these more recent data reveal about choices of law and forum 
relative to mergers in 2011 and Delaware as a state of incorporation? To address 
questions similar to these, Cain and Davidoff used more advanced and powerful 
analytical methods to analyze the merger data from 2004 to 2008, namely multivariate 
logistic regression.45 Thus, the remainder of our analyses will utilize this methodology to 
further understand merger trends based on mergers in the first half of 2011.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 The two-way table was for choice of law and state of incorporation. For both choice of law and 
state of incorporation, the two choices were Delaware and Other. The conservative assumption was 
that Other referred to the same state. For example, if Other state of choice was Ohio, the other state 
of incorporation was also Ohio. But in reality, the Other state of law might be Ohio and the Other 
state of incorporation might be Kentucky. 
45
 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34.  
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 i) Brief Introduction to Logistic Regression 
 
All of the factors, Y, listed in Table 1 are nominal in the sense that the variables 
are either true or false. In logistic regression analysis, one of the variables in Table 1, a 
random variable Y, is defined as Y = 1, and Y = 0 if the response is true or false, 
respectively. Supposing the probability that Y = 1 is p, which is unknown, and the 
probability that Y = 0 is (1- p), we consider the following model:   
 
   Y = f(x) + ε       (1) 
 
Here, f(x) is an unknown function of a subset of variables other than Y listed in 
Table 1, while ε is a random variable with mean zero and some unknown but constant 
standard deviation, σ. Taking the expectation of equation (1), we get, E(Y) = f(x). But 
from the definition of Y, we get expected value of Y, E(Y) = 1*p + 0*(1 – p) = p. Thus 
the unknown function, f(x), is the unknown probability of a true answer, p, for response Y. 
Using the definition of variance, the variance of the left and right hand side of equation 
(1) is: Variance of Y = V(Y) = (1 – p)²p + (0 – p)²(1– p) = p(1– p), and V(Y) = V(ε) = σ². 
Combining the two results indicates that the variance assumption of linear regression—
that the variance is a constant—is violated, which means the data must be transformed to 
stabilize the variance. The following logistic transformation, which is the natural 
logarithm of the odds ratio, is one way to stabilize the variance of Y. This transformation 
is defined as follows. 
 
    
 













xf
xf
Y
Y
YT
1
ln
1
ln)(      (2) 
 
The maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in the model f(x) can be 
computed from the transformed variable T(Y) in equation (2) with the software program 
JMP8®. Using this software, the probability generated is the probability of “Not 0”, 
which is 1 – f(x). 
With this brief introduction to logistic regression we will now address the 
questions posed above relative to choice of law, choice of forum, and state of 
incorporation using this more advanced and powerful statistical method to gain a deeper 
understanding of merger decisions.  
 
 ii) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Law Delaware 
 
The following contingency table, Table 4, reveals that the choice of law and 
forum are highly dependent. In particular note the figures in the third row of each cell 
where Choice of Law and Forum are in the same state range from 66.7% to 94.5%. 
Though the Chi-Square value associated with Table 4 is a statistically significant value 
(Chi-Square 445.1 has P-value < 0.01%) indicating that choice of law and forum are not 
independent, 20% of cells have an expected count of less than 5, which makes the Chi-
Square value suspect. 
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Tests 
 
N DF -LogLike RSquare (U) 
343 9 222.54820 0.5917 
 
Test ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 445.096 <.0001* 
 
Table 4 
Count 
Total % 
Col % 
Row % 
Choice of 
Law DE 
Choice of 
Law NY 
Choice of 
Law CA 
Choice of 
Law Other 
States 
 
Choice of 
Forum DE 
130 
37.90 
80.25 
98.48 
1 
0.29 
2.38 
0.76 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1 
0.29 
0.79 
0.76 
132 
38.48 
Choice of 
Forum 
NY 
5 
1.46 
3.09 
11.11 
37 
10.79 
88.10 
82.22 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3 
0.87 
2.36 
6.67 
45 
13.12 
Choice of 
Forum 
CA 
3 
0.87 
1.85 
21.43 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8 
2.33 
66.67 
57.14 
3 
0.87 
2.36 
21.43 
14 
4.08 
Choice of 
Forum 
Other 
States 
24 
7.00 
14.81 
15.79 
4 
1.17 
9.52 
2.63 
4 
1.17 
33.33 
2.63 
120 
34.99 
94.49 
78.95 
152 
44.31 
 162 
47.23 
42 
12.24 
12 
3.50 
127 
37.03 
343 
 
As an alternative to the two-way contingency table approach for analyzing 
nominal data, consider the following logistic regression model for Choice of Law 
Delaware that contains three factors from the list of variables in Table 1. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -1.63323632 0.2186394 55.80 <.0001* 
Choice of Forum New York?  -0.64956051 0.5467398 1.41 0.2348 
Choice of Forum Delaware?  +5.847847 0.7417692 62.15 <.0001* 
Choice of Forum California?  +0.3339533 0.6870557 0.24 0.6269 
 
The only factor, x, from Table 1 in this model that is statistically significant is the 
Choice of Forum Delaware. Deleting both the Choice of Forum California and New York, 
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the following new model is generated. From the model below, it follows that the Choice 
of Forum Delaware and Choice of Law Delaware are correlated.  
 
RSquare (U) 0.5778 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 343 
  
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -1.7216499 0.1919286 80.47 <.0001* 
Choice of Forum Delaware?  +5.8960261 0.7379183 63.84 <.0001* 
  
Are there other factors from Table 1 that might help explain why mergers choose 
Delaware law? From the last print out, the Choice of Forum Delaware explains almost 
58% (100*RSquare (U)) of the variation in Choice of Law Delaware. We next considered 
other potentially important factors such as: the state of incorporation; the state where 
attorneys do business; whether the acquirer or acquired was a private entity; and what 
type of financial arrangements were used for the merger. Examining the response, Choice 
of Law Delaware, the use of logistic regression provides a multivariate analysis of all 
factors that could potentially impact this decision to choose Delaware law, not just the 
choice for state of forum. The resulting logistic regression model for Choice of Law 
Delaware is as follows. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -2.75801238 0.3766659 53.61 <.0001* 
Choice of Forum Delaware?  +6.1931183 0.8084047 58.69 <.0001* 
Acquirer Inc. in Delaware?  +1.9346607 0.44219 19.14 <.0001* 
Acquirer Corp. Office in New 
York? 
 -2.05072381 1.067887 3.69 0.0548 
 
By transforming this model, Table 5 summarizes all combinations of probabilities,  xf , 
obtained for the Choice of Law Delaware logistic regression model.  
 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 16 
 
16 
Table 5 
Probability 
that Choice 
of Law DE 
Acquirer 
Inc. in 
DE? 
Acquirer 
Corp. 
Office in 
NY? 
Choice 
of 
Forum 
DE? 
0.98 Yes Yes Yes 
1.00 Yes No Yes 
0.05 No Yes Yes 
0.31 No No Yes 
0.89 Yes Yes No 
0.98 Yes No No 
0.01 No Yes No 
0.06 No No No 
 
From Table 5, it follows that the odds of the choice of law being Delaware 
following a merger are highest when the acquirer incorporates in Delaware (an average of 
96%). However, if the acquirer also chooses Delaware as the forum for litigation and the 
acquirer’s corporate office is not in the state of New York, the probabilities are very high 
that the choice of law will be Delaware (100%). Notice that if the acquirer does not 
incorporate in Delaware, the odds are less than about 30% that the choice of law will be 
Delaware independent of state of the acquirer’s corporate office or the choice of forum. 
Suppose we have two mergers in which the acquirers have the same corporate offices and 
chose the same forum. If one merger incorporates in Delaware and the other one does not, 
the odds are greater than 89 percent that the one that incorporated in Delaware will choose 
Delaware law. And the odds are less than 30 percent that the one that did not incorporate 
in Delaware will choose Delaware law. 
 
 iii) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Law New York 
 
In a similar manner, a model can be developed using logistic regression for 
Choice of Law New York, which helps to examine the “flight to New York” issue in 
more detail. The following logistic regression model was developed as the model for 
Choice of Law New York. Only statistically significant factors, x, from Table 1 are 
included in this model. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -5.59266164 0.8357296 44.78 <.0001* 
Choice of Forum New York?  +5.581297 0.6301622 78.45 <.0001* 
Acquirer Attorney bus. NY?  +1.4247077 0.662829 4.62 0.0316* 
Target Private?  +1.6529041 0.696324 5.63 0.0176* 
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This logistic model reveals other factors impacting the choice of law for the state 
of New York. But as the two-way contingency Tables 2 and 3 showed earlier, the model 
above indicates that the state of incorporation has no effect on the choice of law for the 
state of New York, which again negates the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture of “flight to 
New York”.  
Table 6 reveals the probabilities associated with various combinations of choice 
of law for New York, whether or not the attorney does business in the state of New York, 
and whether or not the acquired entity was private. The highest probability that the choice 
of law is the state of New York occurs when the choice of forum is New York, the 
attorney does business in the state of New York, and the acquired entity is private rather 
than public. The choice of forum being either New York or some other state is the major 
factor in this model as it alone explains about 50% of the variation in this response. 
Clearly there is a synergy between the three factors in this model rather than a simple 
linear relationship, which reveals the complex nature of negotiation related to the choice 
of law following mergers. 
 
 
Table 6 
Probability 
that Choice 
of Law is 
NY 
Choice 
of 
Forum 
NY 
Acquirer 
Atty. 
Does Bus. 
in NY 
Acquired 
Private 
0.96 Yes Yes Yes 
0.07 No Yes Yes 
0.84 Yes No Yes 
0.02 No No Yes 
0.80 Yes Yes No 
0.02 No Yes No 
0.50 Yes No No 
0.00 No No No 
 
 iv) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Forum Delaware 
 
It is anticipated based on the logistic regression model for Choice of Law 
Delaware and the lack of independence between the Choice of Law Delaware and Choice 
of Forum Delaware that one of the most important factors, x, from Table 1 for this model 
would be Choice of Law Delaware. Other factors that influence this decision are revealed 
by the following logistic regression model, where it should be noted that all the factors are 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 16 
 
18 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
 
From this model it follows that: 
 1. If the acquirer’s corporate office is in California, the odds are less that the 
choice of forum will be Delaware as might be expected. 
 2. But if the acquirer’s attorney does business in California, the odds are higher 
that the choice of forum will be Delaware. 
 3. If the acquirer’s attorney does business in New York, the odds are still high 
that the choice of forum will be Delaware but not as high as when the acquirer’s attorney 
does business in California. 
 4. If the choice of law is New York, the odds are less that the choice of forum is 
Delaware again because choice of law and choice of forum are not independent. 
 5. If the choice of law is Delaware, all other variables held constant, the odds are 
highest that the choice of forum is Delaware as was initially postulated. 
 
Table 7 lists the actual odds or probabilities associated with all combinations of 
these five factors, which reveals the synergy among these five factors. The first nine rows 
are for Choice of Law Delaware. The second nine rows are for Choice of Law New York. 
The last set of nine rows is for Choice of Law other than Delaware or New York. 
 
 
 
 
 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -4.80972189 0.7741824 38.60 <.0001* 
Acquirer Corp Office in 
California? 
 -1.83628645 0.6177585 8.84 0.0030* 
Acquirer Attorney bus. 
California? 
 +2.3312862 0.7067349 10.88 0.0010* 
Acquirer Attorney bus. NY?  +1.5092787 0.5284111 8.16 0.0043* 
Choice of Law New York?  -2.03376738 1.0053467 4.09 0.0431* 
Choice of Law Delaware?  +5.8374106 0.78073 55.90 <.0001* 
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Table 7 
Probability 
that Choice 
of Forum DE 
Choice 
of Law 
DE? 
Choice of 
Law NY? 
Acquirer 
Corp. 
Office 
NY? 
Acquirer 
Corp. 
Office CA? 
Acquirer 
Atty.  Does 
Bus. In CA 
Acquirer 
Atty. Does 
Bus. In NY 
0.99 Yes No Yes No No Yes 
0.97 Yes No Yes No No No 
1.00 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
0.64 Yes No No Yes No Yes 
0.83 Yes No No Yes Yes No 
0.32 Yes No No Yes No No 
0.97 Yes No No No Yes No 
0.91 Yes No No No No Yes 
0.73 Yes No No No No No 
0.02 No Yes Yes No No Yes 
0.01 No Yes Yes No No No 
0.05 No Yes Yes No Yes No 
0.00 No Yes No Yes No Yes 
0.00 No Yes No Yes Yes No 
0.00 No Yes No Yes No No 
0.00 No Yes No No Yes No 
0.00 No Yes No No No Yes 
0.00 No Yes No No No No 
0.26 No No Yes No No Yes 
0.08 No No Yes No No No 
0.50 No No Yes No Yes No 
0.00 No No No Yes No Yes 
0.01 No No No Yes Yes No 
0.00 No No No Yes No No 
0.07 No No No No Yes No 
0.03 No No No No No Yes 
0.01 No No No No No No 
 
 v) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Forum New York 
 
Upon examining the factors listed in Table 1 as possible variables in a logistic 
regression model for Choice of Forum New York, only one factor was statistically 
significant, namely Choice of Law New York, which was expected based on the two-
factor contingency table. But note that none of the other variables listed in Table 1 were 
statistically significant. And with this simplified model, 61% of the variation in Choice of 
Forum New York was explained as shown below (100*RSquare(U)). 
 
RSquare (U) 0.6101 
Observations  343 
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The logistic model for Choice of Forum New York is as follows. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -3.46216439 0.3385046 104.61 <.0001* 
Choice of Law New York?  +5.5903961 0.5817172 92.36 <.0001* 
 
By transforming this logistic model to obtain  xf , the probability of the Choice 
of Forum New York given Choice of Law New York is 89 percent.  
 
 
 vi)  Logistic Regression Model for Acquirer Incorporates in Delaware 
 
The logistic model shown below is for T(Y), where Y is “Acquirer Incorporates in 
Delaware.” From this model one can predict the probability that the acquirer incorporates 
in a state other than Delaware as well as the complement probability.  The terms shown in 
the model are all statistically significant and represent only those from the list in Table 1 
that are statistically significant with p-values less than 0.05.  
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -1.16774078 0.2210379 27.91 <.0001* 
Choice of Law Delaware?  +1.9171687 0.2759369 48.27 <.0001* 
Choice of Law New York?  +1.1241658 0.3956299 8.07 0.0045* 
Acquirer Corp. Office in New 
York? 
 +2.1683484 0.6616287 10.74 0.0010* 
Acquirer Corp Office in 
California? 
 +1.1916121 0.334108 12.72 0.0004* 
Stock? -1, Both? 0, Cash? 1  +0.4334862 0.1549729 7.82 0.0052* 
Acquirer Private?  -0.70675185 0.3122751 5.12 0.0236* 
 
As the following statistic indicates, only 21% of the variation in this response is 
explained by the terms in this model, that is, by the terms listed in Table 1. Thus, other 
unknown factors contribute to whether or not the acquirer in a merger incorporates in 
Delaware. 
   
RSquare (U) 0.2135 
Observations  343 
  
Table 8 shows the predicted probabilities of the acquirer incorporating in 
Delaware based on this model. The probabilities of the acquirer incorporating in Delaware 
for specific combinations of the significant factors in the model are all listed in this table. 
But a summary of some of these effects is as follows.  
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First, if the choice of law is either Delaware or New York, the probability is 
higher that the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware than if the choice of law is some 
other state. Second, if the acquirer’s corporate office is in either New York or California, 
the probability is higher that the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware than if the 
corporate office is in some other state. Third, if the financial arrangements of the merger 
are all cash, the probability is higher that the acquirer incorporates in Delaware than if the 
terms are stock and cash, and if the terms are stock only, the probability is even less that 
the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware. Finally, if the acquirer is private, the 
probability is less that the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware.  
 
Table 8 
Probability 
that 
Acquirer 
Inc. in DE 
Choice of 
Law DE? 
Choice of 
Law NY? 
Acquirer 
Corp. 
Office NY? 
Acquirer 
Corp. 
Office 
CA? 
Type 
Purchase 
Acquirer 
Private? 
0.82 Yes No No Yes Stock No 
0.69 Yes No No Yes Stock Yes 
0.87 Yes No No Yes 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.77 Yes No No Yes 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.91 Yes No No Yes Cash No 
0.84 Yes No No Yes Cash Yes 
0.58 Yes No No No Stock No 
0.40 Yes No No No Stock Yes 
0.68 Yes No No No 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.51 Yes No No No 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.77 Yes No No No Cash No 
0.62 Yes No No No Cash Yes 
0.92 Yes No Yes No Stock No 
0.86 Yes No Yes No Stock Yes 
0.95 Yes No Yes No 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.90 Yes No Yes No 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.97 Yes No Yes No Cash No 
0.93 Yes No Yes No Cash Yes 
0.67 No Yes No Yes Stock No 
0.50 No Yes No Yes Stock Yes 
0.76 No Yes No Yes 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.61 No Yes No Yes 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.83 No Yes No Yes Cash No 
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0.71 No Yes No Yes Cash Yes 
0.38 No Yes No No Stock No 
0.23 No Yes No No Stock Yes 
0.49 No Yes No No 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.32 No Yes No No 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.60 No Yes No No Cash No 
0.42 No Yes No No Cash Yes 
0.84 No Yes Yes No Stock No 
0.73 No Yes Yes No Stock Yes 
0.89 No Yes Yes No 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.80 No Yes Yes No 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.93 No Yes Yes No Cash No 
0.86 No Yes Yes No Cash Yes 
0.38 No Yes No No Stock No 
0.40 No No No Yes Stock No 
0.25 No No No Yes Stock Yes 
0.51 No No No Yes 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.34 No No No Yes 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.61 No No No Yes Cash No 
0.44 No No No Yes Cash Yes 
0.09 No No No No Stock Yes 
0.24 No No No No 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.13 No No No No 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.32 No No No No Cash No 
0.19 No No No No Cash Yes 
0.64 No No Yes No Stock No 
0.47 No No Yes No Stock Yes 
0.73 No No Yes No 
Stock and 
Cash No 
0.57 No No Yes No 
Stock and 
Cash Yes 
0.81 No No Yes No Cash No 
0.67 No No Yes No Cash Yes 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARLY                    
RESEARCH WITH DATA  
 
This section raises broader questions about empirical research based on readily 
available historical data, rather than data from statistically designed and controlled 
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experiments. These questions may be relevant to deciding how such research is 
conducted, and may shed light on the limits of drawing conclusions based solely on 
quantitative data in the absence of any theory or hypotheses to test. Are there questions 
that raw data cannot resolve and why would this be so? Empirical research raises 
questions about when its results can or should be used to draw normative implication and 
about what approach the law should take, given a certain empirical “reality.” Is there a 
structure that needs to exist before those normative implications can be drawn? Under 
what circumstances does data-driven empirical research suggest the need for further 
qualitative research without which we cannot make normative recommendations? 
Analysis of merger data raises two fundamental questions. First, to avoid 
identification of a merely transient event, empiricists need to confront how much data 
they need to study before drawing conclusions. It may be difficult to identify a 
phenomenon such as a flight in the choice of law when that choice can quickly change. 
The second fundamental question addresses whether raw numbers by themselves can 
illuminate an issue based on a choice by parties, or whether empiricists need to gather 
qualitative data on why the choice was made and by whom in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions.  
Before critiquing empirical work, the benefits should be noted. Empirical 
research in a field such as law can illuminate how parties actually behave. In one of the 
early empirical studies in contract law, Professor Stewart Macaulay studied Wisconsin 
businessmen and lawyers. Through in depth interviews Macaulay found that businessmen 
were likely to ignore the legal niceties of contract law and to rely instead on informal 
mechanisms to resolve disputes.46 That study and its insights inspired an entire generation 
of scholars to study informal mechanisms between contracting parties.47 It prompted 
examinations of entire social networks that provided source of order without legal 
intervention. It caused legal scholars to study experimental data on the interaction 
between informal and formal mechanisms48 and the crowding out phenomenon49 and to 
reexamine the role of law in transactions. Empirical research can thus cause scholars to 
rethink entire fields of law, such as contract law, and to question previously unquestioned 
assumptions, such as the centrality of law in parties’ decision-making.50  
Empirical research can be used to test legal theories of how parties would be 
likely to behave in response to legal rules. Macaulay looked at whether the law of contract 
influenced the way businessmen behaved in their transactions and how they dealt with 
disputes and wrote their contracts. In the corporate context, many scholars have studied 
the dominance of Delaware incorporations and proposed theories to explain the 
                                                 
46
 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 
1 (1963). 
47
 DOUGLASS  NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2004); See 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); See 
also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
48
 See Avner Greif, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY LESSONS FROM 
MEDIEVAL TRADE 293 (2006) (studying informal dispute mechanisms of the Maghribi traders).  
49
 Kraus & Scott, supra note 12, at 1058 (discussing crowding out).  
50
 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).  
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preference.51 In the context studied here, involving the choice of law in the merger 
context, scholars examined whether empirical data on the choice of law mirrored 
Delaware’s dominance in the chartering decision and sought to determine whether a flight 
to New York from Delaware choice of law existed and to identify the factors that 
accounted for the parties’ choice of law. They examined whether parties incorporated in 
Delaware reacted to Delaware law by fleeing from it and choosing another state’s law. 
They were looking at how the parties reacted to the law of a jurisdiction either by 
embracing it or by rejecting it. Empirical research, thus, often helps resolve important 
questions that would otherwise remain unanswered or subject to speculation: i.e., is there 
a flight to New York from Delaware as the choice of law in merger agreements?  
 
A. Determining How Much Data Is Necessary to Draw Conclusions 
To determine how to resolve questions through data collection, an empirical 
researcher must confront how much data needs to be studied in order to gain an accurate 
picture of reality to illuminate an issue and to be able to predict future behavior or events. 
All three papers mentioned above, the Eisenberg and Miller study, the Cain and Davidoff 
study, and this study, sought to resolve whether there was a flight to New York from 
Delaware for the choice of law in merger agreements.  
The authors selected different time periods and used different data sets. To test 
their hypothesis of a flight, Professors Eisenberg and Miller studied a seven-month period 
in 2002. We studied a six-month period in 2011 (January 1, 2011-June 30, 2011). The 
Cain and Davidoff study broke up that span of time into three separate ones 52 to take 
account of some significant real world events. Interestingly enough, Eisenberg and Miller 
used their data to show a flight based on the fact that Delaware incorporated companies 
were less likely to select a Delaware choice of law than a New York incorporated 
company was to select New York for the choice of law.53 They based their concept of a 
flight on the idea that Delaware incorporated companies choosing not to select a Delaware 
choice of law were therefore presumably fleeing Delaware.54 Fewer companies selected 
Delaware law that were incorporated in Delaware. The reverse was true for New York 
incorporated companies; in that case, even though a very small number of companies 
were incorporated in New York, a disproportionately large numbers of companies opted 
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 See, e.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L. J. 663 (1974); See also, Daniel Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1987). 
52
 See infra text accompanying notes 58-66.  
53
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1989.  
54
 As Cain and Davidoff explain, the Eisenberg and Miller study “found that Delaware was chosen 
as the governing law 32.0 percent…of the time. The authors conclude that this represents a flight 
from Delaware since 40.8 percent of targets and 45.9 percent of acquirers were incorporated in 
Delaware.” Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 95. A different theory of flight could have addressed 
whether a change in the frequency with which Delaware law was chosen over different time 
periods would have precipitated a different non-static data collection.  
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for a New York choice of law provision.55 Based on that discrepancy, Professors 
Eisenberg and Miller studied a series of factors such as attorney locale and the place of 
business for the acquiring and acquired companies, and then used regression analysis to 
determine if, after adjusting for these factors, there is a flight to New York away from 
Delaware. Ultimately, their “results confirm the flight from Delaware”56 to New York.  
We have already argued in Part I that there are difficulties with using the relative 
flight result based on showing fewer choices of law than incorporations for several 
reasons. First, the new data does not support the flight thesis in the later period we 
studied. In the first six months of 2011, the actual percentage of incorporations in 
Delaware that choose Delaware law, 65%, is not significantly different from the 
percentage of incorporations in states other than Delaware that select the same state other 
than Delaware for their choice of law, 70%, with the conservative assumption about the 
other states of incorporation and choice of law. The Eisenberg and Miller conjecture 
based on 2002 merger history is not true based on 2011 merger history.  This highlights 
the danger that studying empirical data may identify only a transient phenomenon making 
it difficult to draw significant conclusions about future behavior without tracking data sets 
over time to determine whether the identified pattern holds true. Without that assurance, it 
is premature to reach normative conclusions founded on the potentially transient 
phenomena. Second, even if the data were accurate for a certain time period, the ability to 
draw meaningful conclusions may depend on other factors that are not captured by the 
data itself. For example, it may be hard to draw conclusions if actual data suggests that 
the lawyers drafting the agreements said that they would be happy with either Delaware 
or New York.57  The concern about the drafting lawyers being open to and relatively 
indifferent to New York and Delaware suggests that there are significant limits to drawing 
conclusions about choices without a meaningful engagement with the underlying context 
and reasons behind those choices. 
Assuming that the choice matters and the parties make deliberate choices based 
on perceived stark differences, scholars can solve the transient phenomenon by exploring 
the issue over an extended period of time. Professors Cain and Davidoff have explored 
the question of whether a flight to New York existed in a different way by comparing the 
results in three data sets.  They studied a four-year period from 2004-2008; however, 
instead of using one period, they looked at three different periods, two of which were tied 
to significant events, the Consolidated Edison v. Northeast Utilities case58 and the 
financial downturn. They therefore approached the empirical data differently to assess the 
same question: whether a flight to New York existed.  They found a weak trend to New 
                                                 
55
 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at Table 3A 1989.  As Cain and Davidoff explain, 
“through double sortings of variable and logit models, the authors document a general trend toward 
non-Delaware law…in early 2002.” Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 99-100.  
56
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1974.  
57
 See Kostritsky, supra note 25, at 229, reporting that 92% of lawyers involved in the same set of 
merger agreements studied in this paper are very comfortable or comfortable with Delaware law 
and 87% of such lawyers are very comfortable or comfortable with New York law. Thus, data 
suggests that lawyers are comfortable with the law of either jurisdiction.  
58
 See Consol. Edison v. Ne. Utils., 426 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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York in the first period59 but a subsequent trend to Delaware after Consolidated Edison60 
which then accelerated after the financial recession.61   
What they found was that it was a complex picture and there was no unified flow. 
Instead, while early on they found a “negative flow away from Delaware,”62 later on the 
flow reversed so that by the financial crisis in 2008, there was a “strong flow toward 
Delaware.”63 
After tying the increase in flow toward Delaware to Consolidated Edison and the 
2008 financial crisis, both external events, Cain and Davidoff then developed 
explanations that made sense of both the choice of law and the other events. Using 
empirical data showing a variation in the flow, they developed a theory to help explain 
why the financial crisis would have precipitated a flow given “that legal actors are 
responsive to changes in both law and adjudicative certainty.”64 The greater expertise of 
Delaware judges was not enough to compel companies to choose Delaware all the time 
with the same frequency for all time periods, yet they did so at an increasing rate after the 
financial recession and an adverse court decision. This led Professors Cain and Davidoff 
to conclude that “Delaware’s edge in the market for corporate law may be dependent on 
its ability to produce law that is attractive to merging corporations.”65 The picture of 
choice of law that emerges is a complex one in which Delaware is portrayed as having 
“competitive stature,”66 in the sense that variations in the law play a role in influencing 
the choice of law.67 This explanation seems consistent with lawyers who remark on the 
current salient differences between New York and Delaware law and demonstrate an 
interest in current law by commenting on the latest practitioner manuals documenting the 
differences.68 Professors Cain and Davidoff built a theory of a reverse flight or trend by 
comparing the frequency with which Delaware law was chosen over three different time 
periods. Thus, there is a change in the disparity of choice of law in a time series when the 
data are viewed as a time series.  
Our study uses a complete count69 based on the EDGAR SEC database data in 
one time period, January 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011.70 It uses the Eisenberg and Miller data 
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 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 94.  
60
 Id. at 95. 
61
 Id. at 94.  
62
 Id. at 95.  
63
 Id. 
64
 Id.  
65
 Id. This insight is consistent with one that I gained in a study surveying M&A lawyers who 
seem sensitive to changes in the laws that affect merger agreements; see Kostritsky, supra note 25.  
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 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 94.  
67
 In a separate paper, Juliet Kostritsky surveyed lawyers and found that the choice of law is made 
primarily by lawyers, not clients. See supra note 25, at 221-22.  
68
 Id.  
69
 We did not exclude any mergers because they lacked certain characteristics and so we have a 
complete count study. 
70
 In an earlier version of the paper we also compared the frequency with which Delaware law is 
specified and find an increase in the frequency with which agreements are specifying Delaware as 
the choice of law when compared to the earlier Eisenberg and Miller study.  
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as a benchmark for comparison.71 Our study confirms the Cain and Davidoff study and 
negates the conjecture of a trend toward New York choice of law and away from 
Delaware choice of law.  
These different studies raise three theoretical and conceptual questions for legal 
scholarship. First, how much reality do we need to observe in order to get an accurate 
picture that can provide a foundation for drawing both positive and normative conclusions 
about future behavior? Because lawyers can easily choose to change the choice of law 
with every agreement drafted,72 studying a limited time period may limit the ability to 
detect changes in choice of law over time that respond to changes in the relevant law. The 
Cain and Davidoff study demonstrated that the choice of law appears sensitive to changes 
in the law and society, making it necessary to measure the choice of law at different 
points in time.  
Second, the construction of time periods against which to conduct a comparative 
study to take account of significant life events raises the question of whether an 
explanatory theory using data can be built using the disparity in the choice of law in a 
time series to comprise a trend associated with the triggering events, without doing further 
empirical research on the choices made by the lawyers actually drafting the agreements. A 
further study by Professors Cain and Davidoff or others could follow up to determine 
what effect the financial recession and the failed Consolidated Edison merger73actually 
played in the thinking of the lawyers making the choice of law decisions and whether 
other factors played a role as well. A separate study by Professor Juliet Kostritsky 
surveyed the 812 lawyers drafting the merger agreements in the 2011 data set and 
examined the reasoning underlying the choice of law.  
Third, the empirical evidence of Eisenberg and Miller finding a flight to New 
York law, and the later study of Cain and Davidoff finding a choice of law decision 
changing over time and responding to external events in society and the law,74 implicates 
the question of why we care about empirical evidence and how the evidence will enhance 
our understanding of how and why parties opt for a particular law to govern their merger 
agreement.75 The Eisenberg and Miller study identified factors that might be associated 
with and influential on the choice of law and found, after using multiple regression 
methods that account for those factors, a flight to New York. Cain and Davidoff 
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 Our study does the same using the Eisenberg & Miller study as a baseline for comparison.  
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 Cain and Davidoff make the point that every agreement offers a new chance to choose a choice 
of law. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 93.  
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 2001 was the year of the failed merger but 2005 was the date of the first court decision.  
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 “Nonetheless while a firm’s state of incorporation carries significant weight, the choice of law in 
merger agreements can be affected by court decisions and statutes.” Cain & Davidoff, supra note 
34, at 97.  
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 See Edward Rubin, Empiricism’s Crucial Question and the Transformation of the Legal System, 
in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY ON THE EMPIRICAL AND 
THE LYRICAL 77 (2013) (noting the “crucial insight” of Professor Macaulay and the empiricists that 
we need to find out whether the laws we have devised are “produc[ing] some effect in the real 
world.”). 
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“document a new flight over time to Delaware.”76 These studies all shed light on what 
factors are associated with the parties’ choice of law, help to pinpoint the time period 
associated with a shift in the choice of law, and help to resolve whether there is a flight to 
Delaware away from New York. Perhaps we can surmise that the choice of law 
provisions is working to enhance party choice, and the very existence of changes in the 
choice of law indicates that parties are taking advantage of that freedom. If party choice is 
a primary goal of the legal system, then the data seem to confirm the achievement of one 
goal in allowing parties to choose the law to govern their agreements.  
B. Studying a Flight from Delaware: A Complex Subject for Analysis 
Empirical studies may need to collect data over time in order to gain an accurate 
picture designed to study the flight from Delaware law.  But in focusing on a subject for 
empirical data collection and then building a theory that Delaware companies are fleeing 
Delaware and thereby Delaware law, the identification of a subject that is appropriate for 
empirical research is critical. Such studies also raise interesting issues that may conceal 
underlying problems, which might make the data collected difficult to interpret or even 
misleading. For example, studying a supposed flight may be problematic for a number of 
reasons that are not discussed in prior studies of the issue. 
First, it might be entirely unsurprising that there is a net outflow from Delaware 
but it would be strange to necessarily jump to the conclusion that there is an aversion to 
Delaware law, which a flight thesis implies. There might be all kinds of non-law reasons 
to choose some other jurisdiction for any particular agreement like a merger agreement. 
The Eisenberg and Miller study seems to assume that there are substantive legal reasons 
underlying the flight to New York for the choice of law; otherwise, why describe it as a 
flight?  If no aversion to Delaware law exists, then there is no reason to describe the 
choice of New York law as a flight from Delaware.  
Second, there can be an outflow from Delaware in the first place because there is 
such a tremendous inflow into Delaware and because of the perceived benefits of their 
legal system. Conversely, there can hardly help but be an inflow to New York given the 
dearth of New York incorporations. To claim a departure from a baseline that is 
enormously skewed towards Delaware law constitutes a flight from Delaware law seems 
misguided. As one colleague commented, it has a “Nobody goes there anymore, it’s too 
crowded” connotation.77 
Third, it is unclear whether the raw numbers on choice of law and forum tell us 
anything about the desirability of either jurisdiction’s law. It is difficult to draw any 
meaningful conclusions without knowing why there was a flight. To prove a flight, you 
would need to demonstrate that the decision to leave a jurisdiction was knowing, 
volitional, and deliberate with respect to the content of the law of a jurisdiction. To reach 
meaningful conclusions about a choice, it would be important to interview the lawyers 
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 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 95. “Ultimately we found a weak trend toward Delaware and 
away from New York after the Consolidated Edison decision and a strong flow toward Delaware 
in the financial crisis.” Id.  
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who think of underlying the choice of law in a merger agreement. That data is now 
available.78  
 
C. Determining Whether Raw Numbers Can Illuminate Party Choice 
 
Before attaching significance to data and before finding a flight, one must first 
show that there has been a volitional movement, i.e., not a change in pattern of law 
selection that is coincidental or happenstance, but an intentional decision (any intent, but 
more than mere chance) to favor one state over the other.  One must also rule out 
decisions that are made with a gun to one’s head or choices that are under the influence of 
a random selection machine. So, one or two sets of numbers by themselves do not prove a 
flight.  To prove a flight, you need to find one or more reasons that caused the flight, and 
that they were made intentionally.   
One intentional form of decision is called habit or custom.  That is, one might 
choose a state law because it is customary to do so, or because one has made a habit of 
doing so.  Habits and customs grow up over time, but start as volitional decisions. 
 Someone decided to incorporate new companies in Delaware, and over time the decision 
where to incorporate became a habit.  So now many lawyers incorporate everything in 
Delaware without thinking about it.  There may have been good reasons to do so ab initio, 
but habit and herd instinct are now the drivers, not careful thought. 
In the 2002 study when the predominant choice of incorporation was Delaware 
followed by New York, Professors Eisenberg and Miller found a flight based on these 
numbers: 181 incorporations were in Delaware while there were only 135 choice of law 
clauses selecting Delaware. There is a “flight” in the sense that Delaware corporations 
picked Delaware law to govern in only 135/181 corporations. The reverse was true for 
New York—in which 5 companies were incorporated in New York, and 63 corporations 
selected New York law. In the first six months of 2011, there were 42 mergers in which 
the choice of law was New York. Of these mergers, 25 or 59.52% were incorporated in 
Delaware and 17 or 40.48% were incorporated in states other than Delaware. Testing the 
alternative hypothesis “flight from Delaware” incorporation for choice of law New York 
versus the null hypothesis of “no flight from Delaware” incorporation for choice of law 
New York reveals there is insufficient information to reject this null hypothesis in favor 
of the alternative (P-value 21.7%). This result is contrary to the claims by Eisenberg and 
Miller.79 
To draw conclusions on the significance and meaning of a choice of law, in 
empirical research such as ours, or other prior studies, we need to examine the choice of 
law decisions closely to determine that the choice of law decision to determine that that 
the choice of law was volitional and not mere happenstance. Since the choice of law can 
be chosen each time with each new merger agreement, there is reason to believe that it 
was more than mere chance that resulted in the choice of law. Moreover, our regression 
analysis of the data clearly demonstrated the strong dependence among different factors 
affecting the choice of law. 
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But even if the choice is not happenstance, and is not a coincidence, there are 
reasons to question how much volition and intent one can attach to the choice of law data 
for several reasons and those limitations may narrow the implications one can draw from 
the data on “choice.” If the choice is the result of habit or perhaps an unreflective copying 
of a prior language in a prior agreement by a lawyer, then it may be hard to argue that 
there is anything more at work than a bystander herd effect. Without more and without 
different forms of evidence, we cannot know what really drove the decision making it 
harder to draw meaningful conclusions from the choice. 
Moreover, when a court looks at a party’s choice, and talks about their intent or 
agreement to something such as a choice of law, the court subsumes into what it calls “the 
party's intent” all of the conscious and unconscious decisions that were actually made by 
party's agents and advisors, without those persons necessarily—and in fact usually not—
informing the principal. Decisions made by the agent/advisor without the knowledge or 
understanding of the decision or its implications are thus imputed to the party.    
In addition, a corporate lawyer may be ignorant of many state’s laws, and thus, 
even if the merger agreement selects a particular state law to govern, it may not reflect a 
deliberative choice. Choice of law is an area where this would be almost universally so, 
since few laymen—and not all that many lawyers—have any concept of the real 
differences between state laws. Choice of law is a material element of very few law 
school courses. This ignorance is then compounded by bar exams, which primarily test on 
model codes and universal concepts rather than specific state laws. Many junior lawyers 
will have never considered choice of law issues when they go to draft an agreement, and 
many will copy (and potentially misuse) the precedents on which they rely. 
Another issue complicating the choice of law issue is that the lawyer is acting on 
behalf of the client/commercial firm who is the principal. These issues of choice arising in 
the context of principal and agent raise the difficult issue of determining the extent to 
which the choice80 reflects the principal’s choice at all, making it difficult to attribute 
meaning to the object of the principal’s choice. At the same time, there is a cost/benefit 
issue here that makes this choice of law decision a non-issue in the vast majority of cases. 
 Very few contracts are ultimately the subject of any dispute, and it is even rarer for the 
choice of law to be significant in a dispute.  Applied to contracts generally, choice of law 
has a very slight impact.  There are exceptions, such as the case of non-compete 
covenants, where the provisions may be void in one state and enforceable in another; 
another is in the case of security documents in real estate transactions involving a state 
like California, with its one action rule that would absolutely frustrate lenders who don't 
know about it. Lawyers who work in those fields would generally be expected to know 
about that problem.  But where the risk of litigation is slight, the time spent worrying 
about choice of law is minimized for efficiency sake.  After all, someone has to pay for 
the legal analysis, and few clients will pay for a thorough review of “boilerplate” terms, 
absent some significant reason to do so.  There will be precious few times when a client 
will be able to say that “oh yes, I would have killed the deal had I known the potential 
impact of the difference in state law.”   
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For example, if one looks at the 2002 study, because only 135 corporations chose 
Delaware law out of 181 Delaware corporations, we might have to figure out what was 
going on with the 46 who opted out of Delaware law, perhaps to New York law, before 
we could draw meaningful conclusions. If many of those 46 did not consider the choice at 
all, or did not care because it was not one of the main business points, or the lawyer chose 
and did not inform the principal, then even if the party did not “choose” Delaware, we 
cannot assume they knowingly opted out of Delaware. Further, for any of the 46 who 
chose not to have Delaware law govern a Delaware chartered corporation in a merger 
agreement, and who considered the choice, there might be many reasons contributing to 
the decision. Before one could draw meaningful conclusions from a flight to New York or 
to Delaware, we would need to analyze those reasons.  
Moreover, since there are budget constraints on parties, if the 46 who opted out of 
Delaware thought that the choice of law was unimportant, there may be no significance to 
the opt out. Why call it a flight at all? Moreover, if the lawyer thought that choice of law 
needed to be in every agreement, but that it did not matter much what law was specified,81 
then it would be hard to argue that there was a flight in a meaningful sense or that the 
parties had an aversion to Delaware law. Thus, even if there were a greater frequency with 
“Delaware corporations tend to choose Delaware law less than other corporations choose 
the law of their state of incorporation” (a result we did not find validated in our 2011 
study), it may be hard to draw conclusions if actual data suggests that the lawyers drafting 
the agreements said that they would be happy with either Delaware or New York. If the 
drafting lawyers were open to and relatively indifferent to New York and Delaware, there 
would be significant limits on drawing conclusions on choices without a better 
understanding of the underlying context and reasons underlying the choice. 
Finally, these empirical studies not only raise possible caveats on when we can 
establish a knowing and deliberate flight, and what conclusions to draw from a flight, they 
also seem implicitly to reject the idea that there can be one “overarching” explanation for 
a choice of law, such as the superior expertise of the Delaware judiciary or a unitary 
preference for formalism,82 unless further empirical studies are conducted to compare the 
influence of that factor with other determinants. It is possible to imagine that an empirical 
study could be conducted that isolated formalism as one of the factors contributing to a 
choice of law decision, and compared its effect on the choice of law with other factors 
that actually influenced the decision and the lawyer making the choice. The complexity of 
the influences on choice of law suggests that it could be difficult to find that a choice of 
law, made at a particular point in time, can be explained by a unitary theory, such as a 
preference for formalism. Caution in explaining the choice of law or any other variable 
seems to be the most important lesson from these empirical studies. However, that caution 
should not deter further studies on formalism as an influence on the choice of law 
decision by lawyers and clients; it may be an important subject for further study, but such 
further studies should be careful to consider qualitative research to provide context.  
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Our own empirical study on the flight issue convinced us that before we could 
draw implications from studying a flight pattern, we needed more information from those 
actually making the choice of law decisions.83 Thus, it may be that in seeking to confirm 
or disaffirm initial conclusions on the factors influencing the choice of law, work should 
first be conducted to ascertain the influence of all those factors on the lawyer or on 
lawyers and clients.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we observed and confirmed the strong correlation between the 
choice of law and the factors suggested by Professor Miller and Eisenberg: business 
locale, attorney locale, and state of incorporation. Without dispute, Delaware’s dominance 
as the state of incorporation heavily influences subsequent decisions when it comes to the 
choice of law to govern corporate mergers. As elucidated in Table 3, Delaware law 
governed more than fifty percent of merger contracts.84  This is unsurprising, since 
Delaware was the state of incorporation for more than half of the acquirers we studied.85  
However, the significance of this study is to examine the outflow from Delaware as 
suggested by Professors Eisenberg and Miller.  To that end, while we are able to conclude 
that New York is indeed the second most frequently selected state behind Delaware (by 
comparing data gathered in 2002 and 2011), we find that the actual percentage of 
incorporations in Delaware that choose Delaware law is not significantly different from 
the percentage of corporations in states other than Delaware that select the same state 
other than Delaware for their choice of law. This negates the Eisenberg and Miller 
conjecture of a flight from Delaware. We nonetheless confirmed that, for New York, 
choice of forum influences corporate decisions in the choice of law for New York.  
 Our results, along with Professor Miller and Eisenberg’s results, generate one 
crucial question for further research.  While scholars continue to debate how each factor 
influences the choice of law, the essential question that is closest to the interest of the bar 
remains simple: what influences practitioners to choose a certain state law over another to 
govern merger deals?  Without further empirical evidence on the potential drivers behind 
the choice from direct evidence, we may not be able to identify the statistically significant 
drivers behind those choices. Statistical analysis provided insight into how a variety of 
factors correlated with the choice of law and choice of forum—how merger attorneys 
perceive these factors, whether and how these factors indeed influence practitioners when 
deciding the choice of law, or whether other rationales drive the ultimate choice of law 
decision. Information that is now available in a forthcoming study can help further 
interpret the meaning of the data and the choices.   
The prior empirical studies of the flight issue raise important questions about the 
methodology of empirical research and the restrictions imposed when drawing normative 
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implications on choice of law from a limited data set without further data collection from 
the lawyers making the choices.  
Finally, the data did not bear out the Eisenberg and Miller hypothesis, and data 
alone cannot provide useful insight into whether there is a flight from Delaware and, if 
there is one, why it is occurring.  
 
